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Optimal fingerprinting strategies with one-sided error
A. J. Scott,∗ Jonathan Walgate, and Barry C. Sanders
Institute for Quantum Information Science, University of Calgary, Calgary, Alberta T2N 1N4, Canada
Fingerprinting enables two parties to infer whether the messages they hold are the same or differ-
ent when the cost of communication is high: each message is associated with a smaller fingerprint
and comparisons between messages are made in terms of their fingerprints alone. In the simulta-
neous message passing model, it is known that fingerprints composed of quantum information can
be made exponentially smaller than those composed of classical information. For small message
lengths, we present constructions of optimal classical fingerprinting strategies with one-sided error,
in both the one-way and simultaneous message passing models, and provide bounds on the worst-
case error probability with the help of extremal set theory. The performance of these protocols
is then compared to that for quantum fingerprinting strategies constructed from spherical codes,
equiangular tight frames and mutually unbiased bases.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Consider the following scenario. Alice needs to send an important message to Bob. She does not mind if an
intermediary party reads this message while in transit, but does however, require that the message remains unchanged.
Alice considers broadcasting her message through a trusted public communication channel, her local radio station,
but alas, access time is very expensive and her message is long. Instead she proceeds by sending it across untrusted
communication channels, over the internet, which are inexpensive and plentiful. Alice is now faced, however, with the
possibility that a saboteur has surreptitiously intercepted and changed part, or all, of her message. To test its integrity,
she reluctantly reconsiders buying airtime at her local radio station. Alice’s transmission costs now depend on the
level of risk she is prepared to tolerate, for a corrupted message to pass undetected. An absolute guarantee of integrity
requires Alice to transmit her entire message again, this time through the trusted channel. If however, she is willing
to tolerate a small probability of detection error, a considerably smaller piece of information, called a fingerprint, need
only be sent. Alice could, for example, broadcast only the first byte of her message. This strategy is said to have
one-sided error: when the first byte does not match that for Bob’s copy, Alice knows with certainty that foul play has
occurred. Unfortunately, since it is Bob who must perform the comparison, and no private communication channel is
available, we are forced to assume that Alice and Bob use a strategy which is publicly known. An adversary will now
simply avoid corrupting the first byte, while playing havoc with the rest. There is, of course, a simple workaround:
Alice instead broadcasts a random byte of her message, chosen by flipping a private coin, together with the location
of this byte. Assuming the availability of a trusted, though costly, broadcast channel, Alice has thus obtained a level
of security through only public communication. In a probabilistic sense, message sabotage will never go undetected.
Although motivated in terms of message authentication, the preceding protocol is called fingerprinting. In all
generality, fingerprinting enables separated parties to infer whether the messages they hold are the same or different
when the cost of communication is high: each message is associated with a smaller fingerprint, and comparisons
between messages are made in terms of their fingerprints alone. In the above authentication scheme, the messages
were compared using one-way communication, from Alice to Bob. It is known from the theory of communication
complexity [1, 2], that in the limit of long messages, it is sufficient, and necessary, for Alice to communicate finger-
prints of length Θ(logN) bits, for messages of length N bits, if a small constant error probability is allowed. This
error probability can then be made arbitrarily small through repeated use of the protocol. In another model of com-
munication complexity, called the simultaneous message passing (SMP) model [2], the fingerprints are transmitted by
both Alice and Bob, but this time to a referee, who decides the outcome of the message comparison. In this case it
is sufficient, and necessary, for Alice and Bob to communicate fingerprints of length Θ(
√
N) bits if the error is to be
kept arbitrarily small [3, 4, 5].
We will study both communication models by considering the following generalized scenario. A supplier, who
we call Sapna, chooses two messages, x and y, from a pool of n unique messages and hands them to Alice and Bob,
respectively. Alice and Bob are now tasked with determining whether the messages they hold are the same or different.
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2They are forbidden direct communication, however, but instead allowed to correspond with a referee, called Roger. As
communication is considered expensive, Alice and Bob are limited to sending fingerprints of their original messages,
a and b respectively, which they select from smaller pools of size mA and mB. Roger then infers
EQ(x, y) =
{
1, if x = y
0, if x 6= y (1)
and completes the protocol by announcing a single bit z ∈ {0, 1}. Roger is correct if z = EQ(x, y). In the current
investigation we are concerned only with one-sided-error protocols, in which case, z = 0 is allowed only if x 6= y. Then,
when Roger announces 0, Alice and Bob can conclusively claim that the messages are indeed different. Protocols
with one-sided error are of vital practical importance whenever the cost of false negative results outweighs that of
false positives. This is the case when x and y are in fact expected to be equal. In the above authentication scheme,
the one-sided-error condition means that Bob will always accept an uncorrupted message as authentic, and thus,
transmission throughput remains unaffected when an adversary is not present.
The fingerprinting protocol adopted by Alice, Bob and Roger is publicly announced. The goal of this protocol is to
minimize Roger’s error probability. Sapna, however, may be a saboteur, and always choose message pairs that lead
to the highest error rate in Roger’s output. We thus evaluate fingerprinting protocols according to this worst-case
scenario. The worst-case error probability, Pwce = maxx,y Prob(z 6= EQ(x, y)), then corresponds to the maximum
error rate, and provides an absolute guarantee on the performance of the protocol.
Note that the one-way communication model is realized when mB = n, in which case Bob has the same number of
fingerprints as Sapna has messages, and may simply pass on y to Roger. Bob and Roger may now be thought of as the
same party. The simultaneous message passing model is realized when mA = mB. We are concerned with the small
message limit, however, where it makes more sense to analyze both models within the above general scenario. One
could also consider a model where two-way communication between Alice and Bob is allowed. The added possibility
of multiple communication rounds, however, would make the analysis of this model considerably more complex. We
thus exclude this case.
Quantum fingerprinting protocols [6, 7, 8, 9] allow each classical fingerprint to be replaced by a quantum state.
For a fair comparison, the quantum fingerprints are drawn from a Hilbert space of dimension equal to the number
of available classical fingerprints. That is, instead of drawing from sets of size mA and mB, respectively, Alice and
Bob draw their quantum fingerprints from Hilbert spaces of dimension mA and mB. In the simultaneous message
passing model it is known that fingerprints composed of quantum information can be made exponentially smaller
than those composed of classical information. Specifically, for messages of length N bits, it was shown by Buhrman et
al. [6] that fingerprints composed of Θ(logN) qubits are sufficient, and necessary, to keep the error arbitrarily small.
This exponential resource advantage is not apparent in the one-way communication model, where the classical and
quantum complexities are equal.
In the current article we will investigate optimal fingerprinting strategies in the small message limit. We will present
specific constructions of classical fingerprinting strategies which derive from constant-weight codes, and provide lower
bounds on the worst-case error probability with the help of extremal set theory. These bounds define error rates
which quantum protocols must surpass in order to claim a definitive advantage over classical protocols, and are
thus important for current experimental tests of quantum fingerprinting [10, 11]. In most cases the aforementioned
classical fingerprinting strategies are optimal, having error rates that meet a lower bound. Our results for classical
fingerprinting will be contained in Sec. II, which is further subdivided into a preliminary discussion to set notation,
an indepth study of fingerprinting under the one-way communication model, and a study of general fingerprinting
which concentrates on the SMP model. In Sec. III we will investigate the extent at which classical strategies are
outperformed by quantum fingerprinting strategies. Constructions of quantum strategies will be presented which
derive from spherical codes, equiangular tight frames and mutually unbiased bases. Finally, in Sec. IV we summarize
our results.
II. CLASSICAL FINGERPRINTING
A. Notation and preliminary results
It will prove useful to think of Alice, Bob and Roger forming a team with the common goal of minimizing Roger’s
error probability, and Sapna operating as their opponent. This team uses a pre-established, publicly known protocol.
In this protocol, Alice and Bob have a fixed probability of communicating each fingerprint pair (a, b) to Roger for
given message pair (x, y) provided by Sapna. Furthermore, Roger has a fixed probability of declaring x and y to be
the same message upon receipt of fingerprint pair (a, b).
3Any classical fingerprinting protocol is completely specified by three functions: p : {1, . . . ,mA}×{1, . . . , n} → [0, 1],
q : {1, . . . ,mB}×{1, . . . , n} → [0, 1] and r : {1, . . . ,mA}×{1, . . . ,mB} → [0, 1]. The function p(a|x) is the probability
that Alice sends fingerprint a to Roger, given that she receives message x from Sapna. Similarly, q(b|y) is the
probability that Bob sends b to Roger, given that he receives y from Sapna. The function r(a, b) is the probability
that Roger outputs z = 1, given that he receives fingerprint a from Alice and b from Bob.
We will call the triple (p, q, r) a strategy. When a party’s private strategy (i.e. p, q or r) takes values only in the set
{0, 1}, we call that party’s strategy deterministic. If all parties’ strategies are deterministic we call the triple (p, q, r)
a deterministic strategy. Otherwise a general (i.e. probabilistic) strategy should be assumed. Normalization requires
mA∑
a=1
p(a|x) =
mB∑
b=1
q(b|y) = 1 (2)
for all x and y.
Given a strategy (p, q, r), the probability that Roger outputs 1 when Sapna deals x to Alice and y to Bob is
P
(p,q,r)
1 (x, y) ≡
∑
a,b
p(a|x)q(b|y)r(a, b) . (3)
A strategy is said to have one-sided error when
P
(p,q,r)
1 (x, x) = 1 (4)
for all x. Using such a strategy, it is impossible for Roger to announce 0 when Sapna has supplied Alice and Bob with
identical messages.
Defining the error probability
P (p,q,r)e (x, y) ≡
{
1− P (p,q,r)1 (x, x), x = y
P
(p,q,r)
1 (x, y), x 6= y
, (5)
the average error probability is then
P (p,q,r)ave ≡
1
n2
∑
x,y
P (p,q,r)e (x, y) , (6)
and the minimum achievable average error probability is
Pave(n,mA,mB) ≡ min
p,q,r
P (p,q,r)ave , (7)
where the minimum is taken over all strategies. If, however, the minimum is restricted to only those strategies with
one-sided error, we use P1ave(n,mA,mB) to denote the corresponding minimum achievable average error probability.
It is this second quantity which will be of interest in the current article. The results of Horn et al. [12] immediately
give us our first result:
Theorem 1.
P
1
ave(n,mA,mB) =
k⌈n/m⌉2 + (m− k)⌊n/m⌋2 − n
n2
(8)
where m = min{mA,mB} and k = n mod m.
When mA = mB = m the proof of Theorem 1 follows immediately from Lemmas 2 and 3 of [12]. The last paragraph
in Sec. 2 of [12] explains how to deal with the general case. The strategy which achieves the optimal error probability,
given by Eq. (20) of [12], is in fact deterministic.
Although the average error probability is a perfectly legitimate measure of the performance of a fingerprinting strat-
egy, we will consider the worst-case error probability in this article, which corresponds to the guaranteed performance
of a strategy. The worst-case error probability is simply the largest error probability that Sapna can coerce:
P (p,q,r)wce ≡ maxx,y P
(p,q,r)
e (x, y) . (9)
4Similar to the above, we define the minimum achievable worst-case error probability
Pwce(n,mA,mB) ≡ min
p,q,r
P (p,q,r)wce = minp,q,r
max
x,y
P (p,q,r)e (x, y) , (10)
and denote by P1wce(n,mA,mB) the minimum achievable worst-case error probability when restricted to one-sided-
error strategies. Our objective in the following sections is to find bounds on this second quantity.
To begin, let us introduce a lemma that allows the following simplification. Whereas Roger can use a probabilistic
strategy, we show that there exists a deterministic strategy for Roger, that is at least as good as all probabilistic
strategies.
Lemma 2. Let (p, q, r) be a fingerprinting strategy with one-sided error. Then
P (p,q,r)e (x, y) ≥ P (p,q,r
′)
e (x, y) (11)
for all x and y, where
r′(a, b) =
{
1, if p(a|x) > 0 and q(b|x) > 0 for some x
0, otherwise
. (12)
The proof of this lemma is straightforward and follows from enforcing the one-sided-error constraint [Eq. (4)], by
setting r′(a, b) = 1 for each appropriate fingerprint pair (a, b), and then choosing r′(a, b) = 0 in the remaining cases
for optimality [12]. We define a binary strategy (p, q, r) to be one where r ≡ r′, as determined by Eq. (12). All binary
strategies have one-sided error, and due to Lemma 2, our search for optimal one-sided-error strategies will be limited
to this type. Each particular binary matrix r(a, b) can be thought of as defining a class of possible strategies for Alice
and Bob, i.e. those strategies p and q which do not contradict Eq. (12). In the following sections we will decide which
choices for r(a, b) are best.
B. One-way model: mB = n
The simplest non-trivial examples of classical fingerprinting occur when mB = n, in which case Bob may simply
pass on y to Roger. In general, when mB = n we will always set mA = m, q(b|y) = δby, and then refer to the strategy
only by the pair (p, r). A binary strategy is then one with
r(a, x) =
{
1, if p(a|x) > 0
0, otherwise
, (13)
and thus, Alice’s decisions will determine Roger’s. Alternatively, we may think of Roger’s binary decision matrix,
r(a, x), as specifying a class of strategies with p(a|x) > 0 whenever r(a, x) = 1, and 0 otherwise. Our job is to then
minimize the worst-case error probability
P (p,r)wce = max
x 6=y
P
(p,r)
1 (x, y) (14)
over all such members of this class, where
P
(p,r)
1 (x, y) =
m∑
a=1
p(a|x)r(a, y) . (15)
We first investigate cases where the values of m and n restrict all strategies to those with P
(p,r)
wce = 1. First note
that given
∑
a p(a|x) = 1 and r(a, y) ≤ 1, we will have P1(x, y) = 1 if and only if r(a, y) = 1 whenever p(a|x) > 0, or,
for binary strategies, r(a, y) = 1 whenever r(a, x) = 1. Defining index sets for Alice’s fingerprinting strategy
I(p)x ≡ {a | p(a|x) > 0} , (16)
which specify Roger’s decisions
r(a, x) =
{
1, if a ∈ I(p)x
0, otherwise
, (17)
we have a straightforward lemma.
5q\m 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
1 2 3 6 10 20 35 70 126 252 462 924 1716 3432 6435 12870
4/3 2 3 6 10 20 35 ≥ 56 ≥ 84 ≥ 120 ≥ 165 ≥ 220 ≥ 286 ≥ 364 ≥ 455 ≥ 560
3/2 2 3 6 10 15 21 ≥ 28 ≥ 36 ≥ 45 ≥ 55 ≥ 66 ≥ 78 ≥ 91 ≥ 105 ≥ 120
2 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 12 13 ≥ 17 ≥ 20 ≥ 26 ≥ 28 ≥ 35 ≥ 37
3 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 ≥ 20
4 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 ≥ 16
TABLE I: Known values of T (m,q), the largest q-cover free family in 2[m], or a lower bound when unknown.
Lemma 3. Let (p, r) be a binary fingerprinting strategy. Then P
(p,r)
wce = 1 iff I
(p)
x ⊆ I(p)y for some x 6= y.
We now restate Lemma 3 in the language of extremal set theory [13, 14, 15]. Roger’s decision matrix may be
specified by the set I(p) ≡ {I(p)x |x = 1, . . . , n} which is a subset of the power set 2[m], where [m] ≡ {1, . . . ,m} is
called the m-set. A k-subset of a set X is simply a subset of X with cardinality k, and the set of all such subsets will
be denoted by the symbol
(
X
k
)
. Define an antichain A of the poset (S,⊆) to be a subset of S with the property that
no two members are comparable via the relation ⊆ , i.e. X * Y for all distinct X,Y ∈ A. The length of the antichain
is its cardinality, |A|. The following is now equivalent to Lemma 3.
Lemma 3′. Let (p, r) be a binary fingerprinting strategy. Then P
(p,r)
wce < 1 iff I(p) is an antichain of length n in
(2[m],⊆).
An example of an antichain is
{{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {1, 4}, {2, 3}, {2, 4}, {3, 4}}, which is also the largest antichain in 2[4],
and most easily represented through its binary incidence matrix:
1 2 3 4
1 1 0 0
1 0 1 0
1 0 0 1
0 1 1 0
0 1 0 1
0 0 1 1
. (18)
In our case this incidence matrix is in fact r(a, x), where a indexes the columns and x the rows. The above antichain
has length 6. In general, the length of the largest antichain in 2[m] is
(
m
⌊m/2⌋
)
. This result is due to Sperner [16] and
gives us our first important theorem:
Theorem 4. P1wce(n,m, n) < 1 iff n ≤
(
m
⌊m/2⌋
)
.
When m < n ≤ ( m⌊m/2⌋) an optimal strategy can be found by first collecting all antichains of length n, and then for
each such candidate for I(p), minimize P (p,r)wce over Alice’s transition probabilities p(a|x) to locate the optimal choice.
Consider the case when n =
(
m
⌊m/2⌋
)
for example. If m is even, the set of all m/2-subsets of the m-set,
(
[m]
m/2
)
, is the
only antichain; if m is odd, the sets
( [m]
(m−1)/2
)
and
( [m]
(m+1)/2
)
are the only antichains [13, 17]. In both cases an optimal
strategy follows from choosing I(p) = {I(p)x |x = 1, . . . , n} = ( [m]⌊m/2⌋) and then p(a|x) = 1/⌊m/2⌋ when a ∈ I(p)x (and
zero otherwise). For example, when m = 4 and n =
(
4
2
)
= 6 the above antichain [Eq. (18)] is the only choice, in
which case setting p(a|x) = r(a, x)/2 is optimal, resulting in P (p,r)wce = 1/2. In general, the resulting worst-case error
probability is stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 5. P1wce(n,m, n) = 1− 1/⌊m/2⌋ if n =
(
m
⌊m/2⌋
)
.
Searching for antichains is computationally expensive except for small m and n. We instead turn our attention
to deriving upper and lower bounds for P1wce(n,m, n). Lower bounds follow from generalizing the concept of an
antichain to a k-cover free family of sets [18, 19]. A family of sets is simply a set of sets. We call the family F , k-cover
free when X * Y1 ∪ · · · ∪ Yk for all X,Y1, . . . , Yk ∈ F , where X 6= Yi for all i. Note that a 1-cover free family is an
6antichain. The following incidence matrix specifies an example of a 2-cover free family.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0
(19)
Suppose that Alice uses a strategy where I
(p)
x ⊆ I(p)y ∪ I(p)z for some x 6= y, z. Then, for one choice between the
message pairs (x, y) and (x, z), Sapna will be able to coerce an error probability of 1/2 or greater. This follows from
the inequality
P
(p,r)
1 (x, y) + P
(p,r)
1 (x, z) =
m∑
a=1
p(a|x) [r(a, y) + r(a, z)] ≥
m∑
a=1
p(a|x)r(a, x) = 1 , (20)
since the assumption I
(p)
x ⊆ I(p)y ∪ I(p)z implies that either r(a, y) = 1 or r(a, z) = 1 when r(a, x) = 1. Thus the
worst-case error probability may be less than 1/2 only when I(p) is a 2-cover free family. This observation, in its
generalized form, is the content of the following lemma.
Lemma 6. Let (p, r) be a binary fingerprinting strategy. Then P
(p,r)
wce < 1/k only if I(p) is a k-cover free family of
size n in 2[m].
Unlike in the case of antichains, the size of the largest k-cover free family in the power set 2[m] is a difficult problem,
and consequently, unknown except in a few special cases. Nonetheless, let us denote this number by T (m, k). The
following theorem then applies.
Theorem 7. P1wce(n,m, n) ≥ 1/k if n > T (m, k) .
Corollary 8. P1wce(n,m, n) ≥ 1/k if
(
n
k
)
>
(
m
⌊m/2⌋
)
.
The corollary follows from the fact that a family F is k-cover free only if the set {Y1∪· · ·∪Yk | distinct Y1, . . . , Yk ∈
F} forms an antichain. The obtained bound, however, may be tightened by calculating the exact value of T (m, k).
This problem is also known under the name of superimposed codes [20]. In fact, each k-cover free family of sets F is
equivalent to a superimposed code, in which the binary incidence vectors corresponding to members of F form the
codewords. The exact value of T (m, k) is known when k = 1, in which case Sperner’s result for the largest antichain
applies, and for the following special cases. Tables from [21] show that T (m, 2) = m when m ≤ 8, and T (m, k) = m
when m ≤ 15 and k ≥ 3. Also, our own computational searches have found that T (9, 2) = 12 and T (10, 2) = 13.
These results are tabulated in Table I (integral q), and give many of the lower bounds in Table II for P1wce(n,m, n).
We can generalize Theorem 7 by introducing the concept of a multiset. A multiset is like a set, except that repeated
elements are now allowed, e.g. X = {1, 1, 2, 3}. Multiset operations then differ from set operations in a straightforward
way: X ∪ {2} = {1, 1, 2, 2, 3}, X ∩ {1, 1, 2, 2} = {1, 1, 2}, and {1, 1} ⊆ X but {1, 1, 1} * X . Let ∪jX denote the
multiset union of j copies of X . A family of sets F will be called k/j-cover free when ∪jX * Y1 ∪ · · · ∪ Yk, under
multiset operations, for all X,Y1, . . . , Yk ∈ F , where X 6= Yi for all i. Note that a family of sets is q-cover free for all
rationals q ≤ p whenever it is p-cover free. An example of a 3/2-cover free family is the set ([6]2 ).
Lemma 9. Let (p, r) be a binary fingerprinting strategy. Then P
(p,r)
wce < 1/q only if I(p) is a q-cover free family of
size n in 2[m].
7n\m 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 1 1 1/2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 1 1 1/2 1/2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 1 1 1 1/2 1/2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
8 1 1 1 1/2 1/2 1/2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
9 1 1 1 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
10 1 1 1 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
11 1 1 1 1 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/3 1/3 0 0 0 0 0 0
12 1 1 1 1 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/3 1/3 1/3 0 0 0 0 0
13 1 1 1 1 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/3 1/3 1/3 0 0 0 0
14 1 1 1 1 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/3 1/3 1/3 0 0 0
15 1 1 1 1 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/3 0 0
16 1 1 1 1 2/3 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/3 0
17 1 1 1 1 2/3 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/3 0 – 1/4
18 1 1 1 1 2/3 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/3 – 1/2 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/3 0 – 1/4
19 1 1 1 1 2/3 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/3 – 1/2 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/3 0 – 1/4
20 1 1 1 1 2/3 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/3 – 1/2 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/3 0 – 1/4
21 1 1 1 1 1 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/3 – 1/2 1/3 – 1/2 1/3 1/3 1/3 0 – 1/3
22 1 1 1 1 1 2/3 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/3 – 1/2 1/3 – 1/2 1/3 1/3 1/3 0 – 1/3
23 1 1 1 1 1 2/3 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/3 – 1/2 1/3 – 1/2 1/3 1/3 1/3 0 – 1/3
24 1 1 1 1 1 2/3 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/3 – 1/2 1/3 – 1/2 1/3 1/3 1/3 0 – 1/3
25 1 1 1 1 1 2/3 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/3 – 1/2 1/3 – 1/2 1/3 1/3 1/3 0 – 1/3
26 1 1 1 1 1 2/3 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/3 – 1/2 1/3 – 1/2 1/3 1/3 1/3 0 – 1/3
27 1 1 1 1 1 2/3 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/3 – 1/2 1/3 – 1/2 1/3 – 1/2 1/3 1/3 0 – 1/3
28 1 1 1 1 1 2/3 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/3 – 1/2 1/3 – 1/2 1/3 – 1/2 1/3 1/3 0 – 1/3
29 1 1 1 1 1 2/3 1/2 – 2/3 1/2 1/2 1/3 – 1/2 1/3 – 1/2 1/3 – 1/2 1/3 – 1/2 1/3 0 – 1/3
30 1 1 1 1 1 2/3 1/2 – 2/3 1/2 1/2 1/3 – 1/2 1/3 – 1/2 1/3 – 1/2 1/3 – 1/2 1/3 0 – 1/3
31 1 1 1 1 1 2/3 1/2 – 2/3 1/2 1/2 1/3 – 1/2 1/3 – 1/2 1/3 – 1/2 1/3 – 1/2 1/3 0 – 1/3
32 1 1 1 1 1 2/3 1/2 – 2/3 1/2 1/2 1/3 – 1/2 1/3 – 1/2 1/3 – 1/2 1/3 – 1/2 1/3 0 – 1/3
33 1 1 1 1 1 2/3 1/2 – 2/3 1/2 1/2 1/3 – 1/2 1/3 – 1/2 1/3 – 1/2 1/3 – 1/2 1/3 0 – 1/3
34 1 1 1 1 1 2/3 1/2 – 2/3 1/2 1/2 1/3 – 1/2 1/3 – 1/2 1/3 – 1/2 1/3 – 1/2 1/3 0 – 1/3
35 1 1 1 1 1 2/3 1/2 – 2/3 1/2 1/2 1/3 – 1/2 1/3 – 1/2 1/3 – 1/2 1/3 – 1/2 1/3 0 – 1/3
36 1 1 1 1 1 1 1/2 – 2/3 1/2 1/2 1/3 – 1/2 1/3 – 1/2 1/3 – 1/2 1/3 – 1/2 1/3 – 1/2 0 – 1/3
37 1 1 1 1 1 1 1/2 – 2/3 1/2 – 2/3 1/2 1/3 – 1/2 1/3 – 1/2 1/3 – 1/2 1/3 – 1/2 1/3 – 1/2 0 – 1/3
38 1 1 1 1 1 1 1/2 – 2/3 1/2 – 2/3 1/2 1/3 – 1/2 1/3 – 1/2 1/3 – 1/2 1/3 – 1/2 1/3 – 1/2 0 – 1/2
39 1 1 1 1 1 1 1/2 – 2/3 1/2 – 2/3 1/2 1/3 – 1/2 1/3 – 1/2 1/3 – 1/2 1/3 – 1/2 1/3 – 1/2 0 – 1/2
40 1 1 1 1 1 1 1/2 – 2/3 1/2 – 2/3 1/2 1/3 – 1/2 1/3 – 1/2 1/3 – 1/2 1/3 – 1/2 1/3 – 1/2 0 – 1/2
TABLE II: P1wce(n,m, n), the minimum achievable worst-case error probability for a classical fingerprinting strategy under the
one-way communication model, or the range of possible values when unknown.
This lemma follows from a straightforward generalization of Eq. (20): Suppose now that ∪jI(p)x ⊆ I(p)y1 ∪ · · · ∪ I(p)yk ,
under multiset operations, for some x 6= y1, . . . , yk. Then
P
(p,r)
1 (x, y1) + · · ·+ P (p,r)1 (x, yk) =
m∑
a=1
p(a|x) [r(a, y1) + · · ·+ r(a, yk)] (21)
≥ j
m∑
a=1
p(a|x)r(a, x) (22)
= j , (23)
since the condition ∪jI(p)x ⊆ I(p)y1 ∪ · · · ∪ I(p)yk means that r(a, yl) = 1 whenever r(a, x) = 1 for j different choices of
1 ≤ l ≤ k. Equation (23) implies that P (p,r)1 (x, yl) ≥ j/k for at least one l, and thus the worst-case error probability
can be less than j/k only when I(p) is a k/j-cover free family.
8For rational q, if we let T (m, q) denote the size of the largest q-cover free family in the power set 2[m], then Theorem 7
generalizes to the following.
Theorem 10. P1wce(n,m, n) ≥ 1/q if n > T (m, q) .
Our own computational searches have found that T (m, 3/2) =
(
m
2
)
for m ≤ 7, which is also tabulated in Table I,
and gives the corresponding lower bounds on P1wce(n,m, n) in Table II. This formula, however, is unlikely to be true
in general.
We obtain an upper bound on P1wce(n,m, n) whenever a particular example strategy is found. Consider those
derived from constant weight codes [22, 23]. Recall that the weight of a binary vector u = {ui}ni=1 is wt(u) =
∑
i ui,
and the Hamming distance between two vectors u and v is d(u,v) =
∑
i |ui − vi|. The code-theoretic function
A(n, d, w) is defined as the maximum possible number of binary vectors of length n, Hamming distance at least
d apart, and constant weight w. If we let N(m, k, j) denote the maximum number of k-subsets of the m-set with
pairwise intersections containing j elements or less, then N(m, k, j) = A(m, 2(k−j), k). We can see this by considering
the codewords as incidence vectors for subsets of the m-set, thus defining the isomorphism f : {0, 1}m → 2[m] by
f(u) = {i |ui = 1}, and noting that d(u,v) = 2(k − |f(u) ∩ f(v)|) when wt(u) = wt(v) = k. Now given a family F ,
of n k-subsets of the m-set with pairwise intersections containing j elements or less, we may construct a strategy with
P
(p,r)
wce ≤ j/k by uniquely assigning each index matrix I(p)x (x = 1, .., n) with a member of F and setting p(a|x) = 1/k
when a ∈ I(p)x (and zero otherwise). Thus P1wce(n,m, n) ≤ j/k whenever n ≤ N(m, k, j) = A(m, 2(k − j), k), which
is restated in the following theorem.
Theorem 11. P1wce(n,m, n) ≤ j/k if n ≤ N(m, k, j) = A(m, 2(k − j), k) .
In some cases A(n, d, w) is known exactly [22]. Examples are N(m, k, k − 1) = A(m, 2, k) = (mk ), which is trivial,
N(m, 3, 1) = A(m, 4, 3) =

⌊
m
3
⌊
m−1
2
⌋⌋
, if m 6≡ 5 mod 6
⌊
m
3
⌊
m−1
2
⌋⌋
− 1, if m ≡ 5 mod 6
(24)
and
N(q2, q, 1) = A(q2, 2q − 2, q) = q(q + 1) (25)
if q is a prime power. These results give the upper bounds on P1wce(n,m, n) in Table II. Thus far, we do not know
of a strategy with smaller worst-case error probability than that attained by a constant-weight-code strategy.
Finally, we remark that the inequalities P1wce(n+1,m, n+1) ≥ P1wce(n,m, n) ≥ P1wce(n+1,m+1, n+1) trivially
hold, since increasing the number of messages will not allow lower error probabilities, and a strategy with n + 1
messages and m+1 fingerprints can be constructed from one with n messages and m fingerprints, by simply allowing
Alice to pass on the additional message to Roger as the additional fingerprint.
C. Generalizations and the SMP model: mA = mB
We now apply some of the ideas of the previous section to the general case where Bob’s fingerprint set is also
restricted in size. Defining index sets for Alice’s and Bob’s fingerprinting strategies
I(p)x ≡ {a | p(a|x) > 0} , I(q)y ≡ {b | q(b|y) > 0} , (26)
a binary strategy is one with
r(a, b) =
{
1, if (a, b) ∈ ∪z I(p)z × I(q)z
0, otherwise
. (27)
After inspection of Eq. (3) it is straightforward to see that Lemma 3 of the previous section takes the following
generalized form.
Lemma 12. Let (p, q, r) be a binary fingerprinting strategy. Then P
(p,q,r)
wce = 1 iff I
(p)
x × I(q)y ⊆ ∪z I(p)z × I(q)z for
some x 6= y.
9A necessary condition for P
(p,q,r)
wce < 1 is to have both families of sets I(p) =
{
I
(p)
x
}
and I(q) = {I(q)y } forming
antichains. Note however, that a different labelling of members in one of the families (through subscript x or y)
will, in general, correspond to a different strategy; consequently, the enumeration of elements in I(p) and I(q) is now
important.
Lemma 12 may be used to derive conditions upon which the worst-case error probability is necessarily 1, thus
generalizing Theorem 4 of the previous section. We may also generalize Theorem 4, however, in the following straight-
forward manner. Setting m = min{mA,mB}, we first note that Theorem 4 implies P1wce(n,mA,mB) = 1 whenever
n >
(
m
⌊m/2⌋
)
, since the minimum possible worst-case error probability cannot decrease when the size of Bob’s message
pool, mB, is decreased. We now claim that in fact the converse is also true. That is, whenever P
1
wce(n,mA,mB) = 1
we must have n >
(
m
⌊m/2⌋
)
, or equivalently, P1wce(n,m,m) < 1 when n =
(
m
⌊m/2⌋
)
. Explicit examples of such strategies
will prove our claim. Consider the binary strategies with I(p) = ( [m]
⌊m/2⌋
)
(any labelling of elements in this family
will do) and then I
(q)
y ≡ I(p)y
′
, the complement of I
(p)
y in [m]. Roger’s decisions are dictated by Eq. (27), and hence,
r(a, b) = 1 − δ(a, b). Finally by choosing, for example, p(a|x) = 1/⌊m/2⌋ when a ∈ I(p)x (otherwise zero), and
q(b|y) = 1/⌈m/2⌉ when b ∈ I(q)y = I(p)y
′
, we find that P
(p,q,r)
wce = 1 − 1/(⌊m/2⌋⌈m/2⌉) < 1 and the following theorem
is proven.
Theorem 13. P1wce(n,mA,mB) < 1 iff n ≤
(
m
⌊m/2⌋
)
where m = min{mA,mB} .
The generalization of other results from the previous section was found to be quite difficult. We can say some more,
however, about the special case of Alice and Bob sharing the same set of fingerprints, i.e. when mA = mB = m. In
particular, the strategy given above can be shown to be optimal:
Proposition 14. P1wce(n,m,m) = 1− 1/(⌊m/2⌋⌈m/2⌉) if n =
(
m
⌊m/2⌋
)
.
To see how to show this, consider the case when m is even. Since n =
(
m
m/2
)
, the only choice for I(p) and I(q) is
the antichain
( [m]
m/2
)
. We must now decide how to optimally label the index sets I
(p)
x ∈ I(p) and I(q)y ∈ I(q). There is
in fact only one choice, modulo permutations of message and fingerprint labels, for which I
(p)
x × I(q)y * ∪z I(p)z × I(q)z
for every x 6= y, and by Lemma 12, allows a worst-case error probability less than 1. One can show that for any
labelling of the index sets, every row and every column of the m×m matrix r(a, b) has at least m− 1 entries equal
to 1. The condition for the worst-case error probability to be less than 1 can be satisfied only for those matrices with
a 0 in every row and every column i.e. r(a, b) is a row/column permutation of the m ×m matrix with a diagonal
of 0’s, and off-diagonal elements equal to 1. Such strategies correspond to a message and/or fingerprint relabelling
of the strategy given above, and are optimal when the nonzero transmission probabilities of p(b|x) and q(b|y) are
symmetrically chosen to be 2/m. The case when m is odd is similar.
In principle, we can also use Lemma 12 in this way to locate an optimal strategy for other n. One must, however, test
all possible choices for I(p) and I(q), i.e., all antichains of length n, which grow exponentially in number as n decreases.
Consequently, this laborious task was undertaken only for two special cases, with results: P1wce(5, 4, 4) = 3/4 and
P1wce(9, 5, 5) = 5/6.
In Table III we report the known values of P1wce(n,m,m), or the range of possible values when unknown. Apart
from the above special cases where the exact value of P1wce(n,m,m) was derived, all lower bounds are the same as
those given in the previous section, being derived from the inequality P1wce(n,m,m) ≥ P1wce(n,m, n). Such bounds
are likely to be weak in general.
The upper bounds on P1wce(n,m,m) in Table III come from explicit strategies. First note that we will always have
P1wce(2n,m+n,m+n) ≤ P1wce(n,m, n). This follows from a straightforward conversion of an (n,m, n)-fingerprinting
strategy of the previous section, denoted by (p′, r′) say, into a strategy suitable for employment in the current scenario:
Previously, Alice performed the fingerprinting strategy p′, while Bob simply acted as a relay, and passed his message
on to Roger. To covert this strategy into one suitable for the current scenario, we ask Alice to employ p′ on the first
half of Sapna’s messages and relay the second half, while Bob is tasked with the opposite, fingerprinting on the second
half and relaying on the first. Explicitly,
p(a|x) =
{
p′(a|x), if 1 ≤ a ≤ m and 1 ≤ x ≤ n
δ(a−m,x− n), otherwise , (28)
q(b|y) =
{
p′(b|y − n), if 1 ≤ b ≤ m and n+ 1 ≤ y ≤ 2n
δ(b−m, y), otherwise . (29)
Roger may now always discern which half of the message set ({1, . . . , n} or {n+ 1, . . . , 2n}) that x and y belong to,
by simply noting which subdivision a and b belong to ({1, . . . ,m} or {m + 1, . . . ,m + n}), and immediately calls 0
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n\m 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 1 1 3/4 0 0 0 0 0
6 1 1 3/4 1/2 – 3/4 0 0 0 0
7 1 1 1 1/2 – 3/4 1/2 – 3/4 0 0 0
8 1 1 1 1/2 – 3/4 1/2 – 3/4 1/2 – 3/4 0 0
9 1 1 1 5/6 1/2 – 3/4 1/2 – 3/4 1/2 – 3/4 0
10 1 1 1 5/6 1/2 – 3/4 1/2 – 3/4 1/2 – 3/4 1/3 – 1/2
11 1 1 1 1 1/2 – 3/4 1/2 – 3/4 1/2 – 3/4 1/3 – 3/4
12 1 1 1 1 1/2 – 3/4 1/2 – 3/4 1/2 – 3/4 1/3 – 3/4
13 1 1 1 1 1/2 – 5/6 1/2 – 3/4 1/2 – 3/4 1/2 – 3/4
14 1 1 1 1 1/2 – 8/9 1/2 – 3/4 1/2 – 3/4 1/2 – 3/4
15 1 1 1 1 1/2 – 8/9 1/2 – 3/4 1/2 – 3/4 1/2 – 3/4
16 1 1 1 1 2/3 – 8/9 1/2 – 3/4 1/2 – 3/4 1/2 – 3/4
17 1 1 1 1 2/3 – 8/9 1/2 – 3/4 1/2 – 3/4 1/2 – 3/4
18 1 1 1 1 2/3 – 8/9 1/2 – 3/4 1/2 – 3/4 1/2 – 3/4
19 1 1 1 1 2/3 – 8/9 1/2 – 3/4 1/2 – 3/4 1/2 – 3/4
20 1 1 1 1 8/9 1/2 – 3/4 1/2 – 3/4 1/2 – 3/4
21 1 1 1 1 1 1/2 – 3/4 1/2 – 3/4 1/2 – 3/4
22 1 1 1 1 1 2/3 – 8/9 1/2 – 3/4 1/2 – 3/4
TABLE III: P1wce(n,m,m), the minimum achievable worst-case error probability for a classical fingerprinting strategy under
the SMP model, or the range of possible values when unknown.
when different, or performs r′ appropriately when the same. The resulting worst-case error probability is then equal
to that for the (n,m, n)-strategy (p′, r′). In Table III the upper bound P1wce(10, 9, 9) ≤ P1wce(5, 4, 5) = 1/2 comes
from this method.
To obtain further upper bounds we can consider a variation of the constant-weight-code strategies given in Sec. II B:
If I(p) = {I(p)x } and I(q) = {I(q)y } are ordered families of, respectively, k1- and k2-subsets of the m-set, both of size
n, with the property that ∣∣∣(I(p)x × I(q)y ) ∩ ( ∪z I(p)z × I(q)z )∣∣∣ ≤ j (30)
for all x 6= y, then P1wce(n,m,m) ≤ j/(k1k2). The strategies which achieve this worst-case error probability are
defined by simply setting p(a|x) = 1/k1 when a ∈ I(p)x (zero otherwise), and q(b|y) = 1/k2 when b ∈ I(q)y . Let
us denote by N2(m, k1, k2, j) the largest n such that a pair of such families exist. The following theorem is then a
variation of Theorem 11.
Theorem 15. P1wce(n,m,m) ≤ j/(k1k2) if n ≤ N2(m, k1, k2, j) .
Our own computational searches have found that N2(5, 2, 2, 3) = 8. A strategy with the corresponding worst-case
error probability of 3/4 is defined through the pair of ordered families with incidence matrices
I(p)x :
x 1 2 3 4 5
1 1 0 1 0 0
2 1 0 0 1 0
3 1 0 0 0 1
4 0 1 1 0 0
5 0 1 0 1 0
6 0 1 0 0 1
7 1 1 0 0 0
8 0 0 1 1 0
, I(q)y :
y 1 2 3 4 5
1 1 0 1 0 0
2 1 0 0 1 0
3 1 0 0 0 1
4 0 1 1 0 0
5 0 1 0 1 0
6 0 1 0 0 1
7 0 0 1 1 0
8 1 1 0 0 0
. (31)
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Further computational searches have revealed that N2(6, 2, 2, 3) = 12, N2(6, 2, 3, 5) = 13, N2(7, 2, 2, 3) = 21 and
N2(7, 3, 3, 8) ≥ 26. The remaining upper bounds given in Table III follow from these results.
Finally, returning to the general case, we remark that the lower bounds in Table II and upper bounds in Table III,
give respectively, lower and upper bounds on P1wce(n,mA,mB), if we identify m = min{mA,mB} in both tables. This
follows from the trivial inequality P1wce(n,mA,mB−1) ≥ P1wce(n,mA,mB) ≥ P1wce(n,mA+1,mB). The inequalities
P1wce(n+ 1,mA,mB) ≥ P1wce(n,mA,mB) ≥ P1wce(n+ 1,mA + 1,mB + 1) also hold in the general case.
III. QUANTUM FINGERPRINTING
A. One-way model: mB = n
In the quantum fingerprinting scenario, Alice’s and Bob’s classical fingerprints (a and b) and probability distributions
[p(a|x) and q(b|y)] are replaced by quantum states ρ(x) ∈ Q(CmA) and τ(y) ∈ Q(CmB ), respectively, where Q(Cd) ≡{
ρ ∈ End(Cd) | ρ ≥ 0 , tr(ρ) = 1}. Quantum fingerprinting becomes classical when ρ(x) and τ(y) are diagonal in the
computational basis, in which case we may identify p(a|x) = 〈a|ρ(x)|a〉 and q(b|y) = 〈b|τ(y)|b〉.
We will first investigate quantum fingerprinting when mB = n, in which case Bob encodes Sapna’s messages into
orthogonal quantum states, upon which Roger may perform an orthogonal measurement to unambiguously determine
the state, and thus y. Though implemented with quantum states, this portion of the fingerprinting procedure is
effectively classical. Alice, however, must choose her fingerprints from a Hilbert space of dimension mA = m < n.
Roger’s task is then to test whether the state received from Alice, ρ(x), is ρ(y) or not, with one-sided error, and
thus the projective measurement {P (y), 1−P (y)}, where P (y) projects onto the support of ρ(y), is the only suitable
choice. The worst-case error probability for this strategy is
Pwce = max
x 6=y
tr [ρ(x)P (y)] . (32)
It is intuitively reasonable that Alice should fingerprint with pure states, and thus, we will first consider this case.
The worst-case error probability is then simply the maximal pairwise overlap for Alice’s choice of fingerprint states
{|ψ(x)〉}nx=1 ⊂ Cm :
Pwce = max
x 6=y
|〈ψ(x)|ψ(y)〉|2 . (33)
Consequently, the minimum possible worst-case error probability will be achieved when Alice chooses her set of
fingerprint states to have the minimum possible maximal pairwise overlap. Defining the quantity
δ2(n,m) ≡ min
{|ψk〉}nk=1⊂C
m
max
j 6=k
|〈ψj |ψk〉|2 , (34)
our goal is to now find sets of n pure quantum states in Cm which achieve the minimum, called optimal Grassmannian
packings [24, 25, 26]. We will assume that n ≥ m > 1 in the following.
Lower bounds on δ2(n,m) follow from an isometric embedding of the space of quantum states into Euclidean
space [24, 25]. Each ρ is first associated with a traceless Hermitian matrix under the correspondence A(ρ) ≡√
m
m−1
(
ρ− 1mI
)
. Endowed with the Frobenius norm ‖A‖F ≡
√
tr(A†A), the set of all traceless Hermitian ma-
trices forms a real normed vector space of dimension m2 − 1, in which the images of pure states lie on the unit
sphere ‖A‖F = 1. Through an appropriate parametrization of A, the Frobenius distance for traceless Hermitian
matrices corresponds to Euclidean distance in Rm
2−1. For example, taking xk(A) = tr(λkA), where the lambda
matrices λk (k = 1, . . . ,m
2 − 1) form a traceless Hermitian operator basis (see Appendix A of [27]), we find that
‖A−B‖F = ‖x(A)−x(B)‖2. Consequently, given that for pure states ‖A(ψ)−A(φ)‖2F = 2mm−1 (1−|〈ψ|φ〉|2), a bound
on the maximum possible minimal distance between n points on the unit sphere in Rm
2−1 will imply a bound on
δ2(n,m).
Packings of points on the unit sphere in Rd are called spherical codes [28]. The Rankin bounds for spherical
codes [29] imply for Grassmannian packings, the simplex bound [24, 25]
δ2(n,m) ≥ n−m
m(n− 1) , (35)
with equality possible only when n ≤ m2, and the orthoplex bound
δ2(n,m) ≥ 1
m
, (36)
12
n\m 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 1/4e 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 1/3e 1/9e 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 1/2 .1886 1/16e 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 1/2m 1/5e .1071 1/25e 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 .6051 2/9e 1/8e .0709 1/36e 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
8 .6306 1/4 1/7e .0871 .0502 1/49e 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
9 2/3 1/4e .1615 .1025 1/16e .0384 1/64e 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
10 .7022 1/3 .1687 1/9e .0741 .0491 .0299 1/81e 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
11 .7236 1/3 .1808 3/25e 1/12e .0573 .0394 .0238 1/100e 0 0 0 0 0 0
12 .7236 1/3m .1830 .1277 1/11e .0651 .0456 .0319 .0193 1/121e 0 0 0 0 0
13 .7713 .3871 3/16e .1351 .0972 .0714 .0522 1/27e .0265 .0163 1/144e 0 0 0 0
14 .7820 .4066 1/5 .1411 .1026 1/13e .0577 .0429 .0310 .0222 .0138 1/169e 0 0 0
15 .7963 .4141 1/5 .1452 .1072 4/49e 1/16e .0476 .0357 .0262 .0189 .0118 1/196e 0 0
16 .8061 .4196 1/5e .1506 1/9e .0857 1/15e .0519 1/25e .0303 1/45e .0162 .0101 1/225e 0
17 .8140 .4282 1/4 .1549 .1154 .0893 .0703 .0556 .0438 .0341 .0261 .0196 .0141 .0089 1/256e
18 .8243 .4395 1/4 .1581 .1194 .0926 .0735 1/17e .0471 .0374 .0294 .0227 .0173 .0123 .0079
19 .8366 .4576 1/4 .1581 .1220 .0954 .0764 5/81e 1/20e .0404 .0324 .0257 .0199 .0154 .0111
20 .8382 .4712 1/4m .1581 .1254 .0983 .0790 .0643 1/19e .0431 .0351 .0284 .0226 .0176 .0137
21 .8497 .4733 .2890 4/25e .1271 .1011 .0813 .0667 .0550 .0455 .0375 .0308 .0250 .0200 1/64e
22 .8552 .4948 .2979 1/6 .1293 .1039 .0835 .0688 .0571 .0476 .0397 .0330 .0272 .0222 .0179
TABLE IV: The smallest known maximal pairwise overlap for sets of n pure states in Cm. Entries in boldface signify that
the overlap is optimal. This is the case for all ETFs (denoted by a superscript e) and MUBs (m). Each maximal overlap is
also an achievable worst-case error probability for a quantum fingerprinting strategy under the one-way communication model
(mB = n), with the entries in boldface being the minimum achievable.
if n > m2, with equality possible only when n ≤ 2(m2 − 1).
The simplex bound was derived by Welch [30] and also appears in the context of frame theory [26, 31] where a set
of states which achieves equality is called an equiangular tight frame (ETF). This name derives from the fact that
equality will occur if and only if [26]
|〈ψj |ψk〉|2 = n−m
m(n− 1) , (37)
for all j 6= k, which automatically guarantees a tight frame: ∑k |ψk〉〈ψk| = nmI. Trivial examples of ETFs occur
when n = m (basis in Cm) and n = m + 1 (vertices of the simplex in Rm). Excluding these cases, it is necessary
that n ≤ min{m2, (n−m)2} for an ETF to exist [26, 31]. This condition, however, is far from sufficient. In Table IV
we give all known examples of an ETF for small m and n. Here we tabulate upper bounds on δ2(n,m). The entries
in Table IV marked by a superscript e signify cases where an analytical construction of an ETF is known. These
derive from quadratic residues [33, 38], conference matrices [26, 31, 32, 36, 38], Hadamard matrices [31, 36], graphs
[31, 32, 37], and difference sets [34, 35]. Finally, an ETF is conjectured to exist whenever n = m2 [33, 39], with
analytical constructions for m ≤ 8 and m = 19 [33, 39, 40, 41, 42].
Given the simplex bound on δ2(n,m) [Eq. (35)], we know that all ETFs, when they exist, are optimal Grassmannian
packings. Sets of mutually unbiased bases (MUBs) [43] also give optimal Grassmannian packings. It is known that
when m is a prime power, a maximal set of m + 1 MUBs exists (i.e. n = m2 +m) with constant overlap of 1/m
between elements of different bases, thus saturating the orthoplex bound [Eq. 36]. In Table IV the MUBs are marked
by a superscript m.
When m = 2, the above embedding maps quantum states surjectively into the unit ball in R3 (realizing the Bloch-
sphere representation of a qubit), and our problem is exactly equivalent to finding optimal spherical codes in three
dimensions. Collections of putatively optimal spherical codes can be found online [44], and have the maximal overlaps
in the first column of Table IV. Of these, only in the cases n ≤ 14 has optimality been established (see [45, 46]). For
n = 4, 6, 8, and 12, the optimal spherical codes are given by the vertices of a regular tetrahedron, regular octahedron,
square antiprism, and regular icosahedron, with maximal overlaps δ2 = 1/3, 1/2, (3 +
√
2)/7, and (1 + 1/
√
5)/2,
respectively [28]. Except for n = 8, optimality follows from the Fejes To´th bound [47]: δ2(n, 2) ≥ 14 csc2
[
pin
6(n−2)
]
.
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All other entries in Table IV are the overlaps for the best packings found in a numerical search, and thus, optimality
is not guaranteed. In many cases, however, the given overlap almost saturates the simplex bound and thus must be
at least very close to optimal.
When mB = n, each of the maximal overlaps in Table IV is the worst-case error probability for a quantum finger-
printing strategy. Comparing these to the classical error probabilities in Table II, we see that quantum fingerprinting
strategies generally outperform classical strategies by a sizeable margin. Note, for example, that when n = q(q + 1),
where q is a prime power, there exists a classical constant-weight-code strategy [see Eq. (25)] which requires m = q2
fingerprints to obtain a worst-case error probability of Pwce = 1/q. This class of classical strategies is optimal for at
least q = 2 and 3. There exist ETFs, however, with the parameters m = q2 and n = q(q + 1) + 1 (when q is a prime
power) having equiangular overlaps of 1/q3 [34]. Consequently, for the same m and n, the classical worst-case error
probability above may be reduced to Pwce = 1/q
3, or less, using quantum fingerprints. Taking a different approach,
if we instead fix n = q(q + 1) and Pwce = 1/q, we know that a quantum MUBs strategy exists which achieves this
performance using only m = q fingerprints. Finally, the quantum performance gain is far more impressive if we
instead fix m and Pwce. For example, in the classical case, when m = 4 we know that to achieve Pwce = 1/2 it is
necessary that n ≤ 6. A numerical search, however, finds that there exists a set of n 4-dimensional quantum states
with a maximum pairwise overlap of 1/2, or less, for all n ≤ 75. Thus, quantum fingerprinting strategies can map at
least 75 messages into 4 fingerprints while retaining a worst-case error probability Pwce ≤ 1/2, compared to only 6
messages classically.
In the above analysis we have assumed that Alice’s fingerprint states are pure. Under this restriction, each boldfaced
error probability in Table IV is the minimum possible. Suppose now that Alice is allowed to choose mixed quantum
states for her fingerprints. When m = 2, it is clear from Eq. (32) that pure states remain the only valid choice if she
is to retain Pwce < 1, since any mixed qubit has support on the entire Hilbert space. Consequently, each boldfaced
entry in the first column of Table IV is the minimum achievable worst-case error probability over all (mixed or pure)
quantum fingerprinting strategies. We will conclude this subsection by proving that the remaining boldfaced error
probabilities in Table IV are also the minimum achievable.
Define the quantity
∆2(n,m) ≡ min
{ρk}nk=1⊂Q(C
m)
max
j 6=k
tr (ρjρk) . (38)
By considering the choice ρk = I/m for all k, we immediately arrive at the upper bound ∆
2(n,m) ≤ 1/m. We will
now show that the Rankin lower bounds on the maximum pairwise overlap for a set of pure quantum states [Eq.’s (35)
and (36)] also apply to general quantum states. First note that
tr (ρjρk) =
1
m
+
m− 1
m
tr [A(ρj)A(ρk)] (39)
under the correspondenceA(ρ) ≡
√
m
m−1
(
ρ− 1mI
)
. In the context of deriving lower bounds on ∆2(n,m), we need only
consider sets of quantum states with tr [A(ρj)A(ρk)] ≤ 0 for all j 6= k, since otherwise the maximum pairwise overlap
is greater than 1/m, which exceeds the upper bound. Assuming tr [A(ρj)A(ρk)] ≤ 0, and given that ‖A(ρ)‖F ≤ 1 for
any quantum state, we see that
tr [A(ρj)A(ρk)] ≥ tr
[
A˜(ρj)A˜(ρk)
]
= 1− 1
2
‖A˜(ρj)− A˜(ρk)‖2F , (40)
where the rescaled A˜(ρk) ≡ A(ρk)/‖A(ρk)‖F satisfy ‖A˜(ρk)‖F = 1. Thus, under the above isometric embedding into
(m2 − 1)-dimensional Euclidean space, the Rankin bounds on spherical codes [29] imply that
∆2(n,m) ≥ n−m
m(n− 1) , (41)
and
∆2(n,m) =
1
m
, (42)
if n > m2. Equality in the latter follows from the upper bound.
Finally, denoting Alice’s fingerprint states by ρ(x), and the support of ρ(x) by P (x), the worst-case error probability
Pwce = max
x 6=y
tr [ρ(x)P (y)] (43)
≥ max
x 6=y
tr [ρ(x)ρ(y)] (44)
≥ ∆2(n,m) , (45)
14
and consequently, each boldfaced error probability in Table IV is in fact the minimum achievable worst-case error
probability over all (mixed or pure) quantum fingerprinting strategies.
B. Generalizations and the SMP model: mA = mB
Now consider quantum strategies under the general fingerprinting scenario (mA,mB ≤ n). If Alice sends state ρ(x)
for message x, and Bob sends τ(y), then, given the one-sided-error constraint, it is straightforward to see that Roger’s
optimal measurement on the product state ρ(x) ⊗ τ(y) to determine whether x = y, is the projective measurement
{P1, P0 = 1 − P1}, where P1 projects onto the support of P˜1 ≡
∑
z ρ(z) ⊗ τ(z). The worst-case error probability is
then
Pwce = max
x 6=y
tr [ρ(x) ⊗ τ(y)P1] . (46)
It remains to find good choices for ρ(x) and τ(y). For simplicity, we will restrict our study to strategies where the
fingerprint states are pure, ρ(x) = |ψ(x)〉〈ψ(x)| and τ(y) = |φ(y)〉〈φ(y)| say.
Consider the case where mA = mB = m, and suppose Alice and Bob map messages onto the same set of fingerprint
states, {|ψ(x)〉}nx=1 ⊂ Cm say. If Roger, instead of choosing to project onto the support of
∑
z |ψ(z)〉〈ψ(z)| ⊗
|ψ(z)〉〈ψ(z)|, fixes P1 = Πsym ≡ 12
∑
a,b |a〉〈a| ⊗ |b〉〈b| + |a〉〈b| ⊗ |b〉〈a|, the projector onto the symmetric subspace of
Cm ⊗ Cm, then the resulting worst-case error probability is
Pwce = max
x 6=y
1
2
(
1 + |〈ψ(x)|ψ(y)〉|2) . (47)
The optimal Grassmannian packings described in the previous subsection are now the best choices for {|ψ(x)〉}nx=1.
Although the minimum possible worst-case error probability is bounded below by one half, Pwce =
1
2 [1 + δ
2(n,m)] ≥
1/2, these strategies were found to give the best error rates when n & 12m(m + 1), the dimension of the symmetric
subspace.
We now describe analytical constructions of quantum fingerprinting strategies from ETFs under the SMP model.
For an ETF, the strategy just described has Pwce =
1
2
[
1 + n−mm(n−1)
]
. However when n < 12m(m + 1) we can obtain
smaller worst-case error probabilities in the following way. Suppose the set {|ξj〉}nj=1 forms an ETF in Cm. We choose
|ψ(x)〉 = |ξx〉 and |φ(y)〉 = |ξy∗〉, for Alice’s and Bob’s fingerprint states respectively, where conjugation is done in
the computational basis. Note that P˜1 ≡
∑
z |ψ(z)〉〈ψ(z)| ⊗ |φ(z)〉〈φ(z)| is the sum of n rank-1 operators, and hence,
has rank no greater than n. Using the defining property of an ETF [Eq. (37)], it is straightforward to verify that the
n states
|Ξk〉 ≡
√
m(n− 1)
n2(m− 1)
n∑
j=1
e
2piijk
n |ξj〉 ⊗ |ξj∗〉 , k = 1, . . . , n− 1 , (48)
|Ξn〉 ≡
√
m
n2
n∑
j=1
|ξj〉 ⊗ |ξj∗〉 , (49)
are orthonormal and belong to the support of P˜1. Consequently, these states span the support of P˜1, and Roger’s op-
timal measurement has P1 =
∑n
k=1 |Ξk〉〈Ξk|. The worst-case error probability for the strategy may now be calculated
in a straightforward manner. The result is Pwce =
n2−m2
m2(n−1) .
When n = 2m, ETFs can be used to obtain even smaller worst-case error probabilities. Suppose again that the set
{|ξj〉}nj=1 forms an ETF in Cm. Define the m× n matrix with entries Xjk ≡
√
m
n 〈j|ξk〉. The tight frame condition,∑
k |ξk〉〈ξk| = nmI, implies that the rows of X are orthonormal: XX† = I. Thus, another n−m rows may be appended
to form an n× n unitary matrix U = [XY ], where XY † = Y X† = 0 and Y Y † = I. This last relation implies that a
tight frame in Cn−m may be constructed from the columns of Y by setting 〈j|χk〉 =
√
n
n−mYjk. The set {|χj〉}nj=1 is
in fact an ETF. This follows from the unitarity of U : I = U †U = X†X + Y †Y , i.e. δjk =
m
n 〈ξj |ξk〉 + n−mn 〈χj |χk〉.
Thus, when j 6= k we have |〈χj |χk〉|2 = m2(n−m)2 |〈ξj |ξk〉|2 = m(n−m)(n−1) , which is the defining property of an ETF in
Cn−m. We have shown that the existence of an ETF in Cm guarantees the existence of an ETF (of equal size) in
Cn−m [31]. Note that for the special case n = 2m, the second ETF also belongs to Cm. Importantly, again from
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n\m 2 3 4
2 0 0 0
3 5/8e 0 0
4 2/3e 7/27e 0
5 3/4 .4330 9/64e
6 3/4m 7/15e .2494
7 .8025 11/18e .3398
8 .8153 5/8 5/14e
9 5/6 5/8e .4962
10 .8511 2/3 .5567
11 .8618 2/3 .5904
12 .8618 2/3m .5915
13 .8857 .6935 19/32e
14 .8910 .7033 3/5
15 .8982 .7071 3/5
16 .9031 .7098 3/5e
17 .9070 .7141 5/8
18 .9122 .7198 5/8
19 .9183 .7288 5/8
20 .9191 .7356 5/8m
21 .9249 .7367 .6445
22 .9276 .7474 .6490
TABLE V: The smallest known worst-case error probabilities for a quantum fingerprinting strategy under the SMP model
(mA = mB = m).
the unitarity of U , the inner products of the ETF pair satisfy 〈χj |χk〉 = −〈ξj |ξk〉 for j 6= k. Using this relation and
Eq. (37), it is straightforward to verify that the n− 1 states
|Ξk〉 ≡
√
n− 1
n
n∑
j=1
e
2piijk
n |ξj〉 ⊗ |χj∗〉 , k = 1, . . . , n− 1 , (50)
are the orthonormal and belong to the support of P˜1, where we are choosing |ψ(x)〉 = |ξx〉 and |φ(y)〉 = |χy∗〉 for
Alice’s and Bob’s fingerprint states respectively. Unlike in the previous case,
∑
j |ξj〉 ⊗ |χj∗〉 = 0, which means
rank P˜1 ≤ n − 1. Consequently, Roger’s optimal measurement has P1 =
∑n−1
k=1 |Ξk〉〈Ξk|. The worst-case error
probability for this quantum fingerprinting strategy is Pwce =
3m−2
m(2m−1) .
In Table V, putatively optimal worst-case error probabilities are collected for m = 2, 3 and 4. Strategies which
use ETFs or MUBs are marked by a superscript e or m, respectively. When n < 12m(m + 1) some of the analytical
quantum fingerprinting strategies described above are outperformed by those found numerically, and the corresponding
numerical worst-case error probability is given instead. Numerical strategies were located by setting P1 to the support
of P˜1 ≡
∑
z |ψ(z)〉〈ψ(z)| ⊗ |φ(z)〉〈φ(z)| as the fingerprint sets {|ψ(x)〉}nx=1 and {|φ(y)〉}ny=1 were varied across Hilbert
space. Although none of the quantum error rates in Table V can be claimed optimal, the lower bounds on the classical
error rates in Table III are still surpassed by a fair margin. Again, the performance gain is most impressive when we
consider m and Pwce fixed. For example, in the classical case, when m = 4 we know that to achieve Pwce = 3/4 it
is necessary that n ≤ 6. There exists a set of n 4-dimensional quantum states, however, with a maximum pairwise
overlap of 1/2, or less, for all n ≤ 75. Thus, quantum fingerprinting strategies can map at least 75 messages into 4
fingerprints while retaining Pwce ≤ 3/4 [see Eq. (47)], compared to only 6 messages classically.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this article we have derived lower bounds on the worst-case error probability for a classical fingerprinting protocol
with one-sided error which are applicable in the small-message limit. These are our main results and the content of
Theorems 4, 7, 10 and 13. Although the majority of the lower bounds are tight only in the one-way communica-
tion model, they also apply to a generalized scenario which encompasses the simultaneous message passing model.
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Furthermore, the set-theoretic techniques used for their derivation might be of interest from an asymptotic point of
view. Additionally, we have presented quantum fingerprinting protocols derived from spherical codes, equiangular
tight frames and mutually unbiased bases, with error rates surpassing the classical bounds. We hope that our work
provides some important new results applicable to current experimental investigations of quantum fingerprinting
protocols [10, 11]. The absolute limits of successful fingerprinting protocols provide quantitative measures for the
compressibility of information stored in message strings. Our analysis may be appended to the growing list which
reveal a fundamentally greater capacity to compress data stored as quantum information.
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